Deadly Attack killing 25 CRPF Jawans in Sukma
Why this has happened?
- Absence of strategic clarity, over-dependence of states on Central forces, have crippled the fight against Maoists
- No Training to the CRPF Personnel
- Shortage of MPVs (Mine Protected Vehicles)
- Lack of Intelligence sharing between local police and Central forces
Issues
- No Director General for more than 50 Days: A disciplined force always looks up to its leader for guidance and direction, and his absence creates a sense of uncertainty in the ranks
- No Clarity on Strategy: In the absence of any clear-cut guidelines or directions from the Central government, every state government has been dealing with the problem as per its own assessment of the situation. There is no coherent strategy or plan
- Little help from local forces/administration: CRPF personnel were attacked by about 300 Maoist guerrillas. Obviously, these Maoists must have been in the area for a couple of days. How did the local administration and intelligence have no scent of their presence? Such an intelligence vacuum is inexcusable
- Lack of Training/Leadership: The 74 Battalion personnel also seem to have made serious tactical mistakes. It appears they were having lunch together and huddled in one place. This explains the heavy casualties suffered by them
- No Room for complacency: There has been a significant drop in the volume of Maoist violence. This is, however, not to deny that they retain the capacity to launch lethal strikes. Besides, they have, in the past, shown enormous capacity to reorganise and reinvent
- Unwilling Chhattisgarh Government: There are about 10,000 vacancies in different ranks in the state police. Twenty-three sanctioned police stations have yet to be set up. And, shockingly, there are 14 police stations without any telephone link
- Heavy dependence on central government: The mindset seems to be that Maoism is the government of India’s problem and, therefore, the Central forces should bear the brunt of extremist violence
- Lessons from Punjab: Until the state police makes a frontal attack on the terrorists/Maoists, the battle would never be won
Conclusion
- State governments must realise that it is their battle. They have to lead and the Central forces are to play only a supportive role. Once this transformation in mindset takes place, the tide will definitely turn
- The security forces’ efforts will, of course, have to be supplemented by appropriate socio-economic measures to address the legitimate grievances of the tribal and draw them into the mainstream